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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
boundaries results in tortious consequences within the state. 0 Such a
holding would appear to be in line with the general trend of liberal ex-
tensions of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents (individual and corpo-
rate) evident in areas other than that of automobile litigation.
JUSTIN LUMLEY
ALIMONY OR CHILD SUPPORT - INCOME TAX DEDUCTION
Lester v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 299 (1961)
In Lester v. Commissioner' the United States Supreme Court resolved,
in part, a problem which has vexed the federal courts of appeal for some
time.
Sections 22(k) and 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19392
provide that a husband may take an income tax deduction for periodic
payments to his wife pursuant to a decree, or an agreement incident to a
decree, of separation or divorce. However, a deduction is not allowed for
any portion of the payments which the decree or written instrument
"fixes" as a sum payable for the support of the minor children of the
husband.'
The problem in the Lester case concerns the interpretation of what
constitutes the "fixed sums" referred to by this exception. The litigation
concerned a divorce decree which had incorporated a previous alimony
and support agreement between the husband and wife. The decree pro-
20. In Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), the Supreme Court upheld a judgment
against a nonresident owner for the negligence of his bailee in another state but the suit
was commenced by the plaintiff in the owner's own state. Cf. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.
69 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1943) (The owner was not liable because he did not consent to the
taking of his automobile by an employee.). See Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D.&C. 40 (C.P.
1937) (The owner was liable for acts of his dog in another state on an absolute liability
theory.).
If the foreseeability of consequences resulting from an automobile owner's authorization
of the use of his automobile in another state becomes the paramount factor in determiningjurisdiction, then the problem arises as to how far and under what circumstance a state's
judicial jurisdiction may be extended and still be within the constitutional limitations. In
automobile litigation, this would not be as great a problem as it would be in other areas of the
law. The purpose of nonresident motorist statutes is to enable those injured on a state high-
way to recover by suit within the state. Here, the state's jurisdiction could be expanded to
include anyone who is legally responsible for such accidents. However, if this reasoning is
applied to other areas of the law the problem becomes evident. For example, a breach of
contract, unlike tortious conduct involving an automobile, is usually manifested by a failure
to act. It would be very difficult to say that a meaningful act occurred or an injury resulted
in any particular place. Suppose that a contract was entered into beyond a state's boundaries
and was breached with resulting damages to a resident within the state. Would this be
enough to give that state in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident wrongdoer? Indica-
tions are that the answer will be yes. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
222 (1957), where Justice Black states that a "trend is clearly discernible toward expanding
the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents."
See also, Note, Development In The Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909
(1960).
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-vided for the alimony and support of the wife and children and included
a clause which reduced the payments by specific amounts upon the eman-
cipation, marriage, or death of the children. The question was whether
-the portions of the payments so reduced, were sufficiently "fixed" within
the meaning of the exception in section 22 (k) to deny the husband's de-
duction, as a sum payable for the support of his minor children.
The Supreme Court in the Lester case, in affirming the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit,4 allowed the full deduction to the husband,
basing its decision on the legislative history of the statute. The Court
concluded that Congress intended the exception to include only agree-
ments specifically stating the amounts allocable to the support of minor
children.5
Though purporting to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeal6 on
the question, the Court, in fact only followed the established line of deci-
sions permitting the deduction. The problem was not entirely settled
because the fact situation in the Lester case was distinguishable from that
in two courts of appeal cases which did not allow the deduction.' The
question the Supreme Court left unanswered is this: Are the portions
of the payments sufficiently "fixed" within the meaning of section 22 (k)
when, in addition to the reductions of the payments to the wife and chil-
dren upon emancipation, marriage, or death of any of the children, the
decree provides for a reduction of payments upon the remarriage of the
-wife and an express direction that the remaining portions are to be used
-for the children alone? The Lester case left this open, but two courts of
appeal have declared such payments to be sufficiently "fixed."'
1. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
2. 56 pt. 1 Stat. 816-17 (1942) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 215) thereinafter
dted as CODE §]. Other than the expanded applicability of section 71 discussed on page 403
infra, there is no significant substantive change in the provisions.
3. If the wife must include the payments in her gross income under section 22(k) (or 71),
-the husband may deduct them from his under section 23 (u) (or 215).
4. Lester v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960).
5. The Tax Court had, in most instances, held that under provisions similar to those in the
:support decree in the Lester case the portions of the payments were sufficiently "fixed" as
support for the minor children and as such were taxable to the husband. Truman W. Mors-
man, 27 T.C. 520 (1956); Saxe Perry Gantz, 23 T.C. 576 (1954); Beulah Weil, 22 T.C.
612 (1954); Warren Leslie, Jr., 10 T.C. 807 (1948); William E. MacKay, 23 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 128 (1954); Charles B. Hicks, 22 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 638 (1953); Jason R Swallen,
20 P-H Tax Cr. Mem. 450 (1951). But see Dorothy Newcombe, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 141
(1951); Elsa B. Chapin, 16 P-H Tax Cr Mem. 782 (1943) (The wife was in a higher in-
-come bracket than the husband.).
.6. Certiorari was granted to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeal in 364 U.S. 890 (1960).
M€etcalf v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959), and Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250
T.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 913 (1958) arrived at conclusions contrary
-to that of the court of appeals in the Lester case.
7. Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 913
(1958); Budd v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
.8. Ibid.
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The conflict of decisions within the Sixth Circuit illustrates the effect
of the distinction. On the one hand is Ashe v. Commissioner,9 where the
husband agreed to pay $250 per month "alimony" for the support and
maintenance of his three minor children. The payments were to be re-
duced by one-third as each child became twenty-one years old or self-sup-
porting. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as did the Supreme
Court in the Lester case, permitted the deduction to the husband, because
the amount for the support of the children was not definitely fixed by
the decree."° The decision was based upon the complete discretion and
control that the wife had over the use of the money, which the court
found consistent with true ownership and basically inconsistent with the
interpretation that the payments were "fixed" for the use and support of
the children."
However, in Budd v. Commissioner,2 the court in the same Sixth Cir-
cuit reached an opposite conclusion. The decree of divorce in that case
provided for the reduction of the payments contingent upon the child
reaching twenty-one years of age, dying before that age, or the remar-
riage of the wife. Further, the decree provided that upon remarriage of
the wife the payments received thereafter were to be used only for the
support of her son until he became twenty-one years old. Thus, upon
the remarriage of the wife, her discretion and control over the money
were taken from her and the payments became "fixed" for the support of
her child. Although the court did not say that the absence of discretion
and control over the money was the deciding factor, it appears to be the
reason why the husband was disallowed the deduction in the Budd case."8
9. 288 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1961).
10. In the Second Circuit similar results have been reached. See Lester v. Commissioner,
279 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960); Hirshon's Estate v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.
1957). (In this case the payments continued for the wife even though she no longer was
obligated to support the children.).
11. Deitsch v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957), is another Sixth Circuit case
permitting the husband's deduction. The husband was to pay $250 per month for the support
and maintenance of the wife and their two minor children. If the wife would remarry, the
payments were to be $150 per month. The payments in either case were to be reduced by
one half upon the eldest child reaching eighteen years of age, becoming emancipated, or dying
before that age. When the second child became eighteen years old or both children became
emancipated or died before reaching eighteen, the payments were to stop altogether. The
court allowed the husband's deduction, being unable to find a provision which indicated that
the $3,000 yearly payment was to be made for the benefit of the children alone.
12. 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
13. Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 913
(1958), reached the same result on a similar set of facts. In Metcalf v. Commissioner, 271
F.2d 288 (1st Cir. 1959), Mandel v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 50, (7th Cit. 1950), and its
companion case, Mandel v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1956), the courts disallowed
the deduction to the husband on the basis of the reduction of payments to the children upon
their emancipation, marriage, or death and to the wife upon her remarriage. The issues in
these cases presumably have now been resolved by the Supreme Court in the Lester case.
The Tax Court has unequivocally chosen to follow the Lester decision in similar situations
where the agreement and decree reduced the amount to both the children and the wife as the
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Viewing the Budd decision in relation to the later language of the
Ashe case, where the arrangement for payments so strongly favored the
children,14 there is a strong impression that the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit would follow the exception under the applicable Code pro-
visions 5 and disallow the husband's deduction where the facts are similar
to those in the Budd case until the ramifications of the Lester decision be-
come dear. This fact situation, which the Lester case does not cover,
could continue to trouble the courts.
At the very least the Lester case ensures a tax-free method to the hus-
band for reducing alimony and support payments as the children exempt
themselves from the husband's legal obligation to support. In addition,
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code"6 expands the usefulness of the provi-
sions for such a reduction in the divorce decree or decree of separation
and maintenance.' The deduction for the full payments is now also
available when the couple is separated under a written separation agree-
ment' and a decree for support," which includes an interlocutory
decree °
CONCLUSION
The courts will probably follow the Supreme Court's decision not
only in the Lester fact situation, but also in the fact situation which was
before the court in the Budd case.2 ' The language of the Supreme Court
decision, although somewhat vague, is sufficiently inclusive to permit the
courts of appeal to ignore this dubious distinction if they so choose. No
court has yet disallowed the deduction to the husband specifically on the
contingencies would arise. Lindley S. Bettison, P-H 1961 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (30
P-H Tax Cr. Mem.) 5 61168 (June 9, 1961); Robert E. Dolan, P-H 1961 TAX CT. RiP. &
MEM. DEC. (30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 61165 (June 7, 1961).
In Hirshon's Estate v. Commissioner, 250 .2d 497 (2d Cit. 1957), the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit allowed the deduction despite the decree's direction that the reduced
payments should go for the support of the child upon the remarriage of the wife. However,
there was no provision for the reduction of payments upon the emancipation, marriage, or
death of the child. The court based its decision on a consistent following of Weil v. Commis-
sioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957), which allowed the deduc-
tion under a fact situation similar to the Lester case.
14. See the discussion of the Ashe case p. 402 supra.
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, z§§ 22(k), 23(u), 56 pr. Star. 816-17; CODE §5 71,
215.
16. CODE 55 71, 215.
17. CODE 571(a) (1).
18. CODE 5 71 (a) (2). (The husband and wife must not make a single return jointly.).
19. CODE 5 71(a) (3) (This applies provided the husband and wife do not make a single
return jointly); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b) (6) example (3) (1957) [hereinafter cited as Reg.
fl.
20. Reg. §§ 1.71-1(b) (3), (6) example (4) (1957).
21. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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